Introduction
When John F. Kennedy began his bid for the presidency in 1959, the world was embroiled in a Cold War that had produced devastating weaponry and had ignited American fears during the 1950s and as campaigning began, promised to continue into the next decade. Throughout the campaign and his subsequent administration, Kennedy was a staunch anti-communist warrior. He was dedicated to protecting America, but also subscribed to the prevalent domino theory, believing it was America’s role to support smaller nations from communist threat. However, Kennedy also possessed the ability to see perspective and seek peaceful resolutions when ever possible. Throughout his presidency, John Kennedy’s foreign policy decisions were largely balanced between his resolution to avoid nuclear war at all costs and remaining steadfast in the face of perceived communist aggression when national security was threatened.
When teaching United States history, Kennedy, the Cold War and the modern era all fall towards the end of the term when instructional time is often limited due to pacing compromises made during previous units of study. Although these topics are learned, they are very often not studied, denying students the depth deserved often in favor of allowing popular perception and sometimes myth to preside. The following anthology is intended for high school juniors enrolled in the Advanced Placement United States history course. The documents selected are presented chronologically and offer students the ability to see Kennedy’s nuclear foreign policy emerge and requires students to apply the AP historical thinking skill of continuity and change over time. As a culminating project to assess student learning and understanding, a Document Based Question (DBQ) essay can easily be applied to the documents and essential questions of the anthology.
The anthology begins by addressing his campaign for office and his early presidency, when Kennedy was optimistic about achieving nuclear limitations treaties with Khrushchev and the Soviet Union. While still a candidate for the democratic ticket, Kennedy wrote to Eisenhower expressing concern about the impact campaign rhetoric would have on treaty negotiations and pledged to uphold any treaty agreed upon before the election. Once president, even in the shadow of the botched Bay of Pigs invasion, Kennedy approached the Vienna Summit and Khrushchev with optimism and expectations of a treaty agreement that ultimately was not achieved, leaving Kennedy to say that “it would be a cold winter.” At this point in the anthology, students will examine the American perspective in a political cartoon that summarizes the Cold War atmosphere and ultimately the uncertainty of Soviet initiation of nuclear war.
The second half of the study looks at Kennedy’s decision making when faced with the Cuban Missile Crisis and American national security. Once missile launch sites were detected on Cuban soil in October of 1962 and Soviet ships were en route to Cuba, Kennedy and his administration had to make policy decisions that were in the best interest of both our foreign and domestic policies. Domestically, Kennedy wanted to maintain secrecy for as long as possible in order to not cause panic in the American public. To do so, he kept his schedule campaigning during the mid-term elections for as long as possible, telling the press he had a cold when he eventually had to be at the White House. When making decisions on how to deal with Soviet aggression though, Kennedy had to balance protecting American soil through ensuring weapons were not installed in Cuba while simultaneously avoiding a war triggered by these actions. The three documents addressing the Cuban Missile crisis trace the clear and calculated stand that Kennedy takes with the Soviet Union; first telling Khrushchev what he is going to do, then showing Khrushchev what is doing through his address on national television, and finally his immediate telegram response when war is averted. The final two documents address popular global sentiment after the crisis and then the achievement of a limited nuclear treaty. Once the crisis was over, both the United States and the Soviet Union acknowledged that communication must be achieved between the two nations to ensure that nuclear war is avoided. Although it does not live up to Kennedy’s goal of achieving a broad nuclear treaty, in 1963 the United States and the Soviet Union did agree upon and sign a Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty paving the way for the broader treaties he wanted in the years after his death.
Through the change over time presented through the following documents, students will have the opportunity to study in greater depth the initial philosophy of John F. Kennedy when dealing with nuclear weapons, his reaction and calculation when national security is threatened, and his resolve to avoid nuclear war in the future.
When teaching United States history, Kennedy, the Cold War and the modern era all fall towards the end of the term when instructional time is often limited due to pacing compromises made during previous units of study. Although these topics are learned, they are very often not studied, denying students the depth deserved often in favor of allowing popular perception and sometimes myth to preside. The following anthology is intended for high school juniors enrolled in the Advanced Placement United States history course. The documents selected are presented chronologically and offer students the ability to see Kennedy’s nuclear foreign policy emerge and requires students to apply the AP historical thinking skill of continuity and change over time. As a culminating project to assess student learning and understanding, a Document Based Question (DBQ) essay can easily be applied to the documents and essential questions of the anthology.
The anthology begins by addressing his campaign for office and his early presidency, when Kennedy was optimistic about achieving nuclear limitations treaties with Khrushchev and the Soviet Union. While still a candidate for the democratic ticket, Kennedy wrote to Eisenhower expressing concern about the impact campaign rhetoric would have on treaty negotiations and pledged to uphold any treaty agreed upon before the election. Once president, even in the shadow of the botched Bay of Pigs invasion, Kennedy approached the Vienna Summit and Khrushchev with optimism and expectations of a treaty agreement that ultimately was not achieved, leaving Kennedy to say that “it would be a cold winter.” At this point in the anthology, students will examine the American perspective in a political cartoon that summarizes the Cold War atmosphere and ultimately the uncertainty of Soviet initiation of nuclear war.
The second half of the study looks at Kennedy’s decision making when faced with the Cuban Missile Crisis and American national security. Once missile launch sites were detected on Cuban soil in October of 1962 and Soviet ships were en route to Cuba, Kennedy and his administration had to make policy decisions that were in the best interest of both our foreign and domestic policies. Domestically, Kennedy wanted to maintain secrecy for as long as possible in order to not cause panic in the American public. To do so, he kept his schedule campaigning during the mid-term elections for as long as possible, telling the press he had a cold when he eventually had to be at the White House. When making decisions on how to deal with Soviet aggression though, Kennedy had to balance protecting American soil through ensuring weapons were not installed in Cuba while simultaneously avoiding a war triggered by these actions. The three documents addressing the Cuban Missile crisis trace the clear and calculated stand that Kennedy takes with the Soviet Union; first telling Khrushchev what he is going to do, then showing Khrushchev what is doing through his address on national television, and finally his immediate telegram response when war is averted. The final two documents address popular global sentiment after the crisis and then the achievement of a limited nuclear treaty. Once the crisis was over, both the United States and the Soviet Union acknowledged that communication must be achieved between the two nations to ensure that nuclear war is avoided. Although it does not live up to Kennedy’s goal of achieving a broad nuclear treaty, in 1963 the United States and the Soviet Union did agree upon and sign a Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty paving the way for the broader treaties he wanted in the years after his death.
Through the change over time presented through the following documents, students will have the opportunity to study in greater depth the initial philosophy of John F. Kennedy when dealing with nuclear weapons, his reaction and calculation when national security is threatened, and his resolve to avoid nuclear war in the future.